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GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1958).
See also WILLIAM LECKY, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SPIRIT OF
RATIONALISM IN EUROPE 362 (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1897) (quoting St.
Fulgentius in De Fide, §70 who observed, “Be assured, and doubt not, that even little children
who have begun to live in their mother’s womb and have there died, or who, having just been
born, have passed away from the world without the sacrament of holy baptism, must be
punished by the eternal torture of undying fire.”).
2
“When a woman is faced with the prospect of having a child that will tend to
impoverish her existing family, or that will disgrace her in the eyes of others, she does not
generally regard an early termination of pregnancy as wrongful . . . .” WILLIAMS, supra note 1,
at 189.
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“Nothing is more devastating than a life without liberty. A life in
which one can be forced into parenthood is just such a life.”3
I. INTRODUCTION
Law, unlike morals, is significant only to the living, though in many
situations it refers to or binds the non-living, both the unborn and the dead.
The law vests rights on the unborn and imposes duties on the dead, though
neither of them is treated as person under law.4 The legal rights of the unborn
are reckoned in view of the possibility of their future arrival and those of the
dead to enable the dead to discharge duties and liabilities incurred whilst
they were alive.5 Legal protection of the rights of the unborn and the dead
undoubtedly caters to the interests of the living.6 Nevertheless, at times law
cannot totally ignore the interests of those not alive, leading to conflict.
Unlike in the case of the dead, all the rights of the unborn, including the right
to be born, depend exclusively upon the mercy of the living. It is against
such a backdrop that the right of the mother to abort the unborn demands
close scrutiny.
II. UNBORN AND THE RIGHT TO ABORTION
Abortion may be the oldest of the issues touching the rights of the
unborn. The term abortion in law is used to denote purposeful and deliberate
expulsion of the fetus i.e. induced abortion.7 Practiced from time immemorial
3

Laurence A. Tribe, ABORTION: THE CLASS OF ABSOLUTES 3 (1992)
See R.M.W. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 360 (5th ed. 1985); See, e.g., s. 1, Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5 c 41, § 1(Eng.). “Once a child
has been born it is a ‘person’ and becomes the focus of a host of jural relation.” See DIAS
supra at 261.
5
G.W. PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE, 398–99 (1972).
6
For example, a child can succeed in an action for damages for the pre-natal
injury to its mother after birth. See DIAS, supra note 4 at 260. Similarly, the law of criminal
libel is operative for the dead only if it affects living persons. R v. Ensor (1887) 3 TLR 366
(K.B).
7
The term, in general, denotes both spontaneous and induced ones till viability
of the fetus which takes place by the 28th week of pregnancy. See JAISING P. MODI, A
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 581 (B. V. Subrahmanyam, ed.,
22nd ed. 2001). In this article, the term is used specifically to “any untimely delivery
voluntarily procured with intent to destroy the fetus.” WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 139.
Expulsion of the fetus spontaneously and without human intervention is distinguishingly
called miscarriage. See, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPAEDIA 35 (2005)
4
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down to the modern age, abortion was to “reduce the burdens of maternity,”
“to escape the burden of rearing offspring, to preserve a youthful figure, to
avert the disgrace of extramarital motherhood, [and] to avoid death.”8 Such a
right was recognized from the ancient civilizations in which the legal
concepts were at their rudimentary stage.9 Abortion was accepted in ancient
Greece as evidenced from the recommendations of Plato and Aristotle. 10
Even the morality ridden, mystic legal system of ancient India, which
despised abortion, considered it as of lesser gravity than even usury. 11
Similar views prevailed in other civilizations in various parts of the world.12
As the views across the world evidence, abortion restriction on grounds such
as the right of the unborn and the sanctity of life that were prevalent
beginning in the Middle Ages and the early modern age, did not prevail with
the ancient civilizations.
III. RIGHT TO ABORTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM—
BEGINNING WITH THE ORIGINAL COMMON LAW VERSION
A. Middle Ages and the early Modern Age: The Influence of Christian
Religion
The lack of abortion prohibitions that existed in ancient Greece and
Rome 13 continued only until the age of Ulpian. 14 The accession of
Christianity to a pivotal place as the theological and social force in the
Middle Ages changed the abortion landscape. Christianity, which believes
that God created humans in his form and that every biological change such as
birth, growth, disease, and death was according to God’s grand design,
objected to human interference with that design.15 Unsurprisingly, apart from
homicide in any context and form, methods of contraception and abortion

8
1 WILL DURRANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION 49 (26th ed. 1954). See also
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 139.
9
See, e.g., S. CHANDRASEKHAR, ABORTION IN A CROWDED WORLD 22 (1974).
10
Plato, THE REPUBLIC, bk. V, ch. 461. (A.P. Lindsay ed. trans., J.M. Dent &
Sons). “When couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life
have begun. . . .” Aristotle, THE POLITICS, bk. VII, Ch.16 (Benjamin Jowett trans.) reprinted in
9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, (Robert Maynard Hutchinson ed., 1952) (c. 384
B.C.E.).
11
See the VASISTHA DHARMASUTRA, 1:2.42. For the text, see PATRICK OLIVELLE,
DHARMASUTRAS: THE LAW CODES OF APASTAMBA, GAUTAMA, BAUDHAYANA, AND VASISTHA
361 et.seq. (Patrick Olivelle trs., 2000)
12
See, e.g., KONSTANTINOS KAPPRIS, ABORTION IN THE ANCIENT WORLD, 11
(2002).
13
See Gravina, De Ortu et Progressu Juris Civilis lib 1. 44.
14
See LECKY, supra note 1, at 92.
15
See Genesis, 1:26 (“And God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, in our
likeness . . .”).
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were considered as antagonistic to Christian faith.16 This was confirmed by
the encyclical of Pope Pius XI in 1930, which accepting the view that
innocent life and its sanctity began from the very moment of conception,
proclaimed that the destruction of life at conception, being anti-god, was
avenged by God. 17 The Church later explained that abortion, even for
therapeutic reasons, was not permissible.18 The Christian faith reinforced the
anti-abortion view by proclaiming that one who dies unbaptized dies in
original sin and is condemned to eternal punishment.19
Common law being an heir to the Christian theology, considered
abortion an offense equal to homicide (not murder). 20 The common law,
however, modified the theological view by distinguishing embryo formatus
i.e. fetus that has begun to quicken from embryo informatus and limited the
same to fetus in the stage of quickening.21 The common law so modified the
canonical law that killing of fetus was to be only “a great misprision” and not
felony.22
B. Age of Statutory Regulation
One finds that the impact of religion on the English legal system
steadily increased such that successive law reforms during the age of
renaissance imposed restrictions on the act of abortion on a progressive

16
For discussion on this topic, see, Darren Mitchell, An Argument for Christian
Conservatism in the Abortion Debate within a Contemporary Secular Society (1999) UCL
Jurisprudence Review, 220 at 221–222.
17
See WILLIAM LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUSTUS TO
CHARLEMAGNE, 94 (1913) [hereinafter HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS] (stating, “[t]hus,
again the question of the criminality of abortion has been considerably affected by
physiological speculations as to the time when the foetus in the womb acquires the nature,…
In the modern legislations it is treated as a distinct being from the moment of conception.”);
Casti Connubii, The Encyclical of Pope Pius XI ¶ 67 (December 31, 1939) (“Among whom
we must mention in the first place infants hidden in the mother’s womb. And if the public
magistrates not only do not defend them, but by their laws and ordinances betray them to
death at the hands of doctors or of others, let them remember that God is the Judge and
Avenger of innocent blood which cried from earth to Heaven.”).
18
“We are obliged once more to declare that the direct interruption of the
generative process already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic
reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children.”
See Humanae Vitae, Para 14.
19
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 178. He observes, “Dying in original sin, without
the sacrament of baptism, the child is condemned to eternal punishment.”
20
GEORGE E. WOODBINE, BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE,
I.3.c.21. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940).
21
Seaborne Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MOD. L. REV. 126, 131
(1938). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 143; Shelley Gavigan, The Criminal Sanction as
it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J.
LEGAL HIST. 20, 35–36 (1984).
22
The term “great misprision implies misdemeanor. See E. Coke, Institutes III at
50.
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scale. 23 Thus, the English common law at the dawn of the modern age
punished any abortion that occurred after the stage of quickening. The first
comprehensive legislative venture in this respect was the Ellenborough Act
of 1803, which penalized abortion even in pre-quickening stage, with
imprisonment for a term up to fourteen years irrespective of whether
continuance of the pregnancy is dangerous to her life or not. 24 Thus, the
Ellenborough Act took away the two-fold liberty women had enjoyed before
its enactment, viz., the absolute right to abortion in the pre-quickening stage
and the right to abortion as a therapeutic measure thereafter. 25 Thus, a
comparison of the nineteenth century law with the laws of civilizations of the
previous centuries reveals a dramatic change in the law of abortion insofar as
it prohibited and punished abortion of a fetus in the pre-quickening stage.26 A
pregnant woman in the earlier Middle Ages enjoyed much more freedom and
liberty over her fetus than what was allotted under subsequent English
common law insofar as a woman in the early Middle Ages was absolutely
free to procure abortion before quickening. It is observed that such a change
in the law “was of great significance because nearly all women who procure
their own abortion do so in the early months of pregnancy before
quickening.” 27 This regressive contrast continued through the general
revisions of the law in 182828 and 1837,29 to the extent that they punished
abortion irrespective of the stage of pregnancy and the condition of the
pregnant woman. 30 This position was left unchanged even after the Offences
Against the Person Act, which also considered abortion as punishable
irrespective of the stage of pregnancy and the life or health of the mother.31
Such a position also implies that abortions, even in cases like ectopic or such
23

Thus, by the arrival of the Lord Elleborough’s Act in 1803, the English law
though of abortion of the child before and after quickening as offences. See WILLIAM BIRKET,
REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON ABORTION, 27 (1939).
24
43 Geo.3 c.58 § II (Eng. 1803).
25
Id.
26
See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text.
27
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 144.
28
9 Geo 4, c. 31, § 13. (Eng. 1828)
29
7 Will 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85 § 6 (Eng. 1837)
30
Id. (changing § 13 of the 1828 act in two ways; on one hand took away the
distinction between the pre and post quickening and on the other hand repealed the death
penalty for abortion which the 1828 Act had introduced); See also Seaborne Davies, Childkilling in English Law, 2 MOD. L. REV. 203, 214. (1937). See also, Loren G. Stern, Abortion:
Reform and the Law, 59 CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 84, 85 (1968)
31
Offenses against the Person Act, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100 §§ 58–59 (Eng.). The
statute reads, “Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own
miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever,
with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child,
shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent
shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable …to be kept in penal
servitude for life…”; 12(1) HARLSBURY’S STATUTES 128 (2008)
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other abnormal pregnancies dangerous to one’s life, were not exempted from
criminal liability.32 Under English law it was not even necessary that one
should be pregnant to receive a punishment for abortion, as even an attempt
to perform an abortion of a non-pregnant woman invited penalty. 33
Additionally, the law did not favor abortion on socio-eugenic grounds.34
In England, this outworn position continued until the enactment of
Infant Life (Preservation) Act in 1929, which, carved out an exception to §
58 of the Offences against Persons Act of 1861, and, in effect, introduced the
liberty to procure abortion. 35 The Infant Act provided that the liability for
destroying the life of a child capable of being born alive was limited to
abortions made “not in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life
of the mother.”36 Nevertheless, the Infant Act did not differentiate a fetus in
the pre-quickening stage from that in the post-quickening, implying that
abortion in any stage of pregnancy would invite penalty if it fell outside the
parameters of the proviso. In other words, the liberty of a woman to procure
abortion even after the enactment of the Act was still limited as compared to
that of a woman in ancient and early medieval Europe.37
32

Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and
Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 393 (1978–1979) (observing that the only limitation on the
criminality of abortion was that a woman could not be punished if she were not actually
pregnant); cf. Gavigan, supra note 21, at 36 (observing, “[t]he twentieth century reform of the
abortion legislation has been focused by yet another medical concept, that of the ‘therapeutic
abortion’. It is an interesting paradox that (on one view of the original prohibition) the first
anti-abortion statute was enacted to protect the maternal life and health from the dangers of
the abortion procedure; in this century, concern to protect the woman’s lives from the dangers
of criminal abortion have led to movements for repeal, or at least calls for reform of the law,
through legal recognition of therapeutic abortions.’”).
33
See, e.g., R. v. Whitchurch, [1890] 24 Q.B.D. 420 (1890). In this case, the first
accused, believing that the second accused was pregnant from the third accused, conspired to
procure abortion. Distinguishing the case of procuring abortion of for a woman who was not
pregnant from the present one where they conspired to procure miscarriage, which amount to
felony, Lord Coleridge C.J., held the accused liable under the Offences against the Person Act,
1861.
34
The expression socio-eugenic grounds in relation to abortion connotes a very
wide spectrum of situations leading to delivering a child with mental incapacity or congenital
or hereditarily acquired incurable diseases like amaurotic idiocy, microcephalis, hemophilia,
Down’s Syndrome etc. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1 at 160–163.
35
The Infant Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34 (Eng.) (hereinafter “the Infant Act”).
36
Id. at § 1. It reads, “ Subject as hereinafter in this subsection provided, any
person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by any
willful act causes a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother, shall be
guilty of felony, to wit, of child destruction, and shall be liable on conviction thereof on
indictment to penal servitude for life; Provided that no person shall be found guilty of an
offence under this section unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child
was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother.”
37
Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or
Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise From the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a
Fourteenth-Century Common Law Liberty?,17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 336 (1971–1972) (“English and
American women enjoyed a common-law liberty to terminate at will an unwanted pregnancy,
from the reign of Edward III to that of George III. This common-law liberty endured, in
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C. 20th Century England—the Dawn of Abortion as a Human Right
The anti-abortion attitude of the theology ridden English common
law system continued in the twentieth century. 38 The scenario of such an
undesirable plight gradually began to change after the 1930s.39. The changing
note was, in part, engendered by the fervor of feminine equality developed in
the communist society of the Soviet Union in the second decade of the last
century.40
In England it was the judiciary that sounded the changing note in a
case involving the legality of an abortion in which a highly skilled surgeon
dared to perform a procedure on a girl of 15 years to terminate a pregnancy
caused by rape.41 He was charged under § 58 of the Offences against the
Person Act of 1861.42 While directing the jury about the case, Macnaghten,
Judge of the Central Criminal Court, laboriously dealt with the law relating
to abortion.43 Distinguishing a previous case that came before him in which
an abortion was performed by an unskilled and unqualified person, he said
that the accused in the present case performed “the operation as an act of
charity, without fee or reward, and unquestionably believing that he was
doing the right thing, and that he ought, in the performance of his duty as a
member of a profession devoted to the alleviation of human suffering, to do
it.” 44 Judge Macnaghten further explained that the prohibition against
“procur[ing] the miscarriage” in § 58 of the Offences against the Person Act
of 1861, must be read in conjunction with the proviso to § 1 of the Infant
Act, which stipulated that the destruction of child life “in good faith for the
purpose only of preserving the life of the mother” was not an offence under
England, from 1327 to 1803; in America, from 1607 to 1830.” Abortion in the ancient and
medieval ages was not treated as despicable but at times as desirable.); see HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN MORALS, supra note 17, at 20–21 (“The influence of Christianity in this respect
began with the very earliest stage of human life. The practice of abortion was one to which
few persons in antiquity attached any deep feeling of condemnation . . . . The death of an
unborn child does not appeal very powerfully to the feeling of compassion, and men who had
not yet attained any strong sense of the sanctity of human life, who believed that they might
regulate their conduct on these matters by utilitarian views, according to the general interest of
the community, might very readily conclude that the prevention of birth was in many cases an
act of mercy. In Greece, Aristotle not only countenanced the practice, but even desired that it
should be enforced by law, when population had exceeded certain assigned limits. No law in
Greece, or in the Roman Republic, or during the greater part of the Empire, condemned it.”)
38
See Anthony N. Cabot, History of Abortion Law, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 73, 85–93
(1980).
39
It was Soviet Russia that began liberalization of abortion by 1917. This was
followed by Iceland in 1935, Sweden in 1938, and Denmark in 1939 while Finland and
Norway passed similar laws in 1950 and 1960 respectively. See, Chandrasekhar, supra note 9
at 49–51; Dellapenna, supra note 32 at 407–08.
40
See, e.g., Chandrasekhar, supra note 9 at 49.
41
Rex v. Bourne, [1938] 3 All E.R. 615 (Cent. Crim. Ct.)
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 616
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the Act. 45 Explaining the clause “in good faith for the purpose only of
preserving the life of the mother” in § 1 of the Infant Act, he expressed doubt
whether there was a real distinction between “danger to life and danger to
health” and observed:
As I say, you have heard a great deal of discussion as to the
difference between danger to life and danger to health. It
may be that you are more fortunate than I am, but I confess
that I have felt great difficulty in understanding what the
discussion really meant. Life depends upon health, and it
may be that health is so gravely impaired that death results .
. . . But is there a perfectly clear line of distinction between
danger to life and danger to health? I should have thought
not. I should have thought that impairment of health might
reach a stage where it was a danger to life. For, so far as
danger to life is concerned, you cannot, of course, be certain
of the result unless you wait until a person is dead. Nobody
suggests that the operation only becomes legal when a
patient is dead….The surgeon is justified in cutting off an
arm or a leg, or taking out an eye, if, in his honest opinion,
he thinks it is desirable to do so for the sake of the patient’s
health. The difficulty that arises in the case of abortion is
that by the operation the potential life of the unborn child is
destroyed. The law of this land has always held human life
to be sacred, and the protection that the law gives to human
life it extends also to the unborn child in the womb. The
unborn child in the womb must not be destroyed unless the
destruction of that child is for the purpose of preserving the
yet more precious life of the mother.46
Explaining the position further, the judge said that unless the doctor,
“basing his opinion upon the experience and knowledge of the profession, [is
of the opinion] that the child cannot be delivered without the death of the
mother,” the doctor is justified in performing abortion if he believes “on
reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the probable
consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman
a physical or mental wreck.”47 Giving a very wide and liberal interpretation
to the words “for the purpose of preservation of life of the mother” in § 1 of
the Infant Act, the judge held that a doctor was entitled and duty bound to

45

Id. at 691 (quoting Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34,

§ 1 (Eng.)).
46
47

Id. at 617, 619–20.
Bourne, 3 All E.R at 618–19, 694 .
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“destroy the unborn child in the womb. . . for the purpose of preserving the
yet more precious life of the mother.”48
Bourne tempered the interpretation of the scope of the 1861 Act
provision that prohibited abortion and provided no exception, by dovetailing
the contents of the clauses of “good faith” and “preserving the life of the
mother” in the Infant Act into the 1861 Act. 49 Additionally, by interpreting
the Act broadly to include “preservation of the life of the mother” the Bourne
court was able to avoid limiting its ruling to the instances of imminent loss of
life by including cases of gradual ending of life that may take place as a
result of mental stress and emotional trauma.50
Needless to say, the Infant Act was a springboard that enabled the
judiciary to take a meaningful dive into the right to abortion so as to swim
forward toward legalization. The Bourne case was a ‘test case’ in an era
which did not approve even therapeutic abortion.51 It could be said that the
directions to the jury in Bourne were legendary in that they opened new
vistas of abortion law and that Bourne’s case is to abortion what Donough’s
is to the law of consumer protection.52 The concept of therapeutic abortion
formulated in Bourne’s case raised new questions regarding its scope.53
Despite the breakthrough in abortion law proposed by Bourne,
comprehensive evaluation of the questions relating to abortion and
48
Bourne, 1 K.B. at 620 (emphasis added). The judge in that context reminded
the jury that while deciding the legality of abortion the fact that Parliament had raised the age
of marriage to 16 presumably because, it was undesirable for a child below that age to go
through the state of pregnancy and labor at such a tender age as it would cause terrible mental
anguish. Id.at 619. See also WILLIAMS supra note 1, at 152. “Apparently the interest of the
mother in living a single extra day is preferred to the life of the child.”
49
Bourne, 1 K.B. at 616–18.
50
“The effect of his ruling is to read into the abortion statute the same exception
as that in the child destruction statute, and to interpret ‘preserving the life of the mother’ in an
extended sense to include preserving the longevity of the mother.” See WILLIAMS, supra note
1, at 151.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Caroline M de Costa, The King Versus Aleck Bourne, 191 (4) MED. J.
AUST. 230, 231 (2009). In Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (Eng.) the House of
Lords held that a manufacturer of a product that reaches the ultimate consumer without the
possibility of intermediary examination and with the knowledge that absence of reasonable
care in the preparation or putting up of the product would result in the injury to the consumer
owes a duty to the latter to take reasonable care, albeit there is no contractual relationship
between them. The holding in that case – the neighbor principle - “[y]ou must take reasonable
care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbor” has been considered to be milestone in English law of consumer protection.
See W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT, 68–72 (1979).
53
Williams has observed that there are as many as six questions relating to
therapeutic abortions. (1) Is the performance of the operation limited for the purpose of
preventing the mother from having her days cut short? (2) Is the exception limited to the
somatic illness of the mother? (3) Is the defense of necessity objective? (4) Whether the
necessity must always be known to the surgeon? (5) Should the therapeutic abortions be
without charging fee? (6) With whom lies the burden of proof? See WILLIAMS, supra note 1 at
153–70.
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legalization in the modern context did not take place in England until the
enactment of the Abortion Act of 1967.54 In the Abortion Act of 1967, as
Lord Denning observed, the “approach to the subject was revolutionized.”55
The significance of the Abortion Act is that it laid down clear grounds on
which women would be able to procure abortions. The Act provided that a
pregnancy not beyond the 24th week could be terminated if its continuance
would involve risk “greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing
children of her family.”56 Or that “if the child were born it would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.” 57
Thus, while the Ellenborough’s Act of 1803 and the Offences against Person
Act of 1861 prohibited abortion, the Infant Act and the Abortion Act of 1967
recognized the reality that abortion has become necessary in the modern life
to enable people to lead a peaceful human life.58
The Abortion Act is different from the previous Acts in two respects.
First, duration of pregnancy is not a relevant factor in deciding its
termination, provided the conditions laid down in the Act for the same are
satisfied.59 Second, and more importantly, unlike its predecessors, the law
recognizes abortion as an instance of individual right of women on certain
socio-economic grounds. 60 Undoubtedly, in all respects, the 1967 abortion
law signals an era of gender equality and liberty of women to have selfdetermination over her body and family. In this sense, an individual woman’s
liberty is placed in front of her yet to be born child.
IV. ABORTION LAW IN AMERICA
Across the Atlantic, the individual states of the United States of
America, with exception of a few, followed the common law tradition
formed out of Christian principles prohibiting abortion.61 Initially, the states
that enacted statutes distinguished abortion in the pre-quickening stage from
the post-quickening stage with increased penalty for the latter, but by the end
of the nineteenth century, the distinction was obliterated by providing
increased penalties for abortion from the moment of conception.62 Thus, one
54

EMILY JACKSON, MEDICAL LAW, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS, 666 (2010);
The Abortion Act, 1967 c. 87 (Eng.).
55
See Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v. Department of Health
and Social Security, [1981] 1 All E.R. 545, 554.
56
The Abortion Act, 1967 c. 87, at § 1(a)–(d).
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., Harry J. Gensler, A Kantian Argument Against Abortion, 49 Phil.
Studies 83, 85 (1986); cf. FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 66 (Beverly
Baines et.al. eds. 2012).
59
Cf. Infant Act at § 1 (2).
60
See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
61
CHANDRASEKHAR, supra note 9, at 53
62
See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 282; See also
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finds the influence of Christianity in the law relating to abortion across the
Atlantic.63 It has been aptly observed:
“There appears to be a twofold reason why most of the states in the
United States and why Great Britain prior to 1967 had highly restrictive
abortion laws on the statute books. Their implicit cultural purpose was
primarily that of embodying the Judeo-Christian belief in the right to life and
the necessity of preserving human life even when the existence of ‘human
life’ was problematic to some degree.” 64
A. The 20th Century Scenario
Abortion law continued on the basis of Christian principals in the
United States until 1973 with the decision in Roe v. Wade.65 In Roe v. Wade,
the Supreme Court examined whether a Texas law prohibiting abortion
abridged the right to privacy of the petitioner as guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 66
Examining the history of abortion law in England and America, the Court
found that the blanket prohibition of abortion was, in part, a result of the
influence of religion. 67 The Court also deduced that women of the 19th
century had more freedoms than those of the 20th century to resort to
abortion.68 The State of Texas defended the law on three grounds: (1) the law
discouraged illicit sexual conduct, (2) the law reduced the medical procedure
of abortion, thus protecting the state’s interest in the life of the mother; and
(3) the law protected the life of the fetus, which from the moment of
conception is a person under law.69 Observing that the opinions as to the
commencement of life were divergent (implying that commencement of life
cannot be an index for determining the right of the unborn), the Court held
that the concept of the right to privacy entrenched by the Constitution was
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140–141 (1972). “It is thus apparent that at common law, at the
time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century,
abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect.
Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a
pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of
pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice
was present in this country well into the 19th century.”
63
See also Jennifer Strickler & Nicholas L. Danigelis, Changing Frameworks in
Attitudes Toward Abortion, 17(2) SOC. F. 187, 190 (2002)(discussing the positive correlation
between active participation in the Catholic religion and negative views of abortion).
64
DANIEL CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY, 126 (1970). But,
unlike England, most of the American states expressly provided that abortion was lawful if
necessary to preserve the life of the woman. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 150.
65
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (holding unconstitutional a law that prohibited an
unmarried pregnant woman who desired terminate her pregnancy from terminating her
pregnancy).
66
Id. at 119.
67
Roe, 410 U.S. at 133–34, 138.
68
Id. at 158.
69
Id. at 148–50, 160.
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wide enough to include the right of women to procure abortion.70 Though not
absolute and unqualified, the Court held:
[The] right to privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy.71
One of the main arguments for the law raised by the State was that
the term ‘person’ in the Fourteenth Amendment should be extended to the
unborn fetus. Rejecting the contention, the Court held that the term “person”
in the Fourteenth Amendment did not include unborn fetuses and that life did
not commence until live birth. 72 “Person” is traditionally used in
jurisprudence to denote living persons, and the term “person” is extended to
unborn and dead persons for the benefit of the living or only when violation
of the rights of such persons affect the interests of the living.73 Legal systems
exist for the protection of the interests of those in vivo, thus, actions for the
death of the fetus due to prenatal injuries vindicate the interests of its parents

70

See Norman Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right of
Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 872 (1974)(“The dominant issue in Roe was whether there is
a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.”).
71
Roe, 410 U.S. 113 at 154. (“[A] State may properly assert important interests in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At
some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain
regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved,
therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.”); See also Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (“The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child
is at the very heart of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a particularly
important place in the history of privacy,”).
72
Id. at 158–61. (“In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been
reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to
accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the
rights are contingent upon live birth.”). For a discussion on this count see, Jack M. Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 337–40 (2007).
73
See PATON, supra note 5, at 395. He observes, “Most systems lay down the rule
that, in cases where legal personality is granted to human beings, personality begins at birth
and ends with death.” Id.
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and not to protect the rights of the fetus.74 Even if the unborn is considered a
“person”, no one is expected to cater to its interests at their own cost.75
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas explained that the concept
of personal liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment was of such a wide import
that it included: “autonomous control over the development and expression
of one’s intellect, interests, tastes, and personality;” “freedom of choice in
the basic decisions of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation,
contraception, and the education and upbringing of children;” and “the
freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or
compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.”76 Hence the right to abortion
formed part of the concept of personal liberty of the mother to decide
whether to bear an unwanted child. 77 Agreeing with the majority, he
succinctly observed:
Elaborate argument is hardly necessary to demonstrate that
childbirth may deprive a woman of her preferred lifestyle
and force upon her a radically different and undesired future.
For example, rejected applicants under the Georgia statute
are required to endure the discomforts of pregnancy; to incur
the pain, higher mortality rate, and aftereffects of childbirth;
to abandon educational plans; to sustain loss of income; to
forgo the satisfactions of careers; to tax further mental and
physical health in providing child care; and, in some cases,
to bear the lifelong stigma of unwed motherhood, a badge
which may haunt, if not deter, later legitimate family
relationships.78
The significance of Roe lies in the directive force of the decision that
examined the problems relating to abortion from the individual and private
point of view of women instead of explaining them from the broad male
ridden social milieu as was done in the past. This aspect is clear from the
74

Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. Observing on the rights against pre-natal injuries, the
court observed that the same was only “to vindicate the parents’ interest and is thus consistent
with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn
children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other
devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians at litem.” Cf. WILLIAMS
supra note 1, at 199 & 208; see also Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 (1)
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47–66 (1971).
75
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Glanville
Williams observes that commutation of the sentence by the Crown in R v. Dudley Stephens 14
Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.) implies that the accused, a crew cast away in a ship wreck, were not
expected to die rather than to kill the cabin-boy of the ship and sustain on his body. See
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, A TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW, 606 (1983). For a beautiful
philosophical discussion of the issue see generally, Thompson, supra note 74.
76
Roe, 410 U.S. at 211, 213 (Douglas J., concurring).
77
Id. at 211–14.
78
Id. at 214–15.
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declaration of Justice Douglas who, instead of examining the issue from a
purely religious point of view, considered it as one relating to the problems
of childbearing women. Without question, Roe revolutionized the American
law of abortion.
B. Attempts to Overturn Roe and the Judicial Suspicion
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Roe was a rude shock to many people,
jolting their conscience and causing an unprecedented outcry in America.79
“Objections came from all points of the political spectrum. To most
conservatives, the decision appeared utterly without moral foundation; many
moderates found it lacking in constitutional justifications; [and] the [liberal]
left complained that the Court offered the wrong justifications.”80 Meanwhile
the lawyers condemned the decision as undemocratic and the reasoning as
not envisaged by the Constitution.81 Small wonder, from the very moment of
the decision, there were legal and constitutional attempts, as well as political
campaigning to upset the decision. 82 The battle surrounded both the
constitutional methodology adopted by the Court and the moral and ethical
aspects of abortion. Disapproval of Roe resulted in the adoption of new
strategies by Congress and state legislatures,83 which instead of making a

79

See Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, 36 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June
29,1989) [hereinafter The Great Abortion Case] (stating “[n]o judicial decision in our time has
aroused as much sustained public outrage, emotion, and physical violence, or as much
intemperate professional criticism, as the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,
which declared, by a seven to two majority, that women have a constitutionally protected right
to abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.”).
80
See DEBORAH L. RHODE, Reproductive Freedom in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
305, 310 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
81
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 124 (2005); John
Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935
(1973) (“What is unusual about Roe is that the liberty involved is accorded a far more
stringent protection, so stringent that a desire to preserve the fetus’s existence is unable to
overcome it—a protection more stringent, I think it fair to say, than that the present Court
accords the freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment. What is
frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of
the Constitution.”).
82
From 1973–1989, 49 States passed 306 anti-abortion measures to tide over Roe
v. Wade. See Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L. J. 1318, 1326 (2009); See also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S
LAW THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 44 et.seq. (1996) [hereinafter
FREEDOM’S LAW].
83
Brenda D. Hofman, Political Theology: The Role of Organized Religion in the
Anti-Abortion Movement, 28 J. CHURCH & STATE 225, 239 (1986) (“Having failed to elect a
presidential sympathizer to its cause in 1976, the pro-life movement sought alternative means
of undercutting, if not altogether reversing, the Roe v. Wade decision. For one thing, the
movement shifted from an electoral to a legislative focus, concentrating its efforts on getting
pro-life legislation introduced in Congress. The movement scored its first big victory in the
House of Representatives in 1977 with the passage of the Hyde Amendment.”)
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direct affront to the right to privacy84 “tried merely to pull one thread,” 85
each of which in result would denude the right of its content, warranting
more judicial discussion on the topic.86 Thus, instead of crippling the right as
such, the attempts have been directed to restricting certain attendant rights,
“the boundary or ‘edge’ issues,” without which the right to abortion cannot
be meaningfully exercised by women.87
However, it is doubtful whether the critics of Roe have correctly
appreciated the socio-economic factors that necessitated recognition of
abortion as an ingredient of the right to privacy. The objections of the critics
of abortion have religio-moral bases and are not directed at the problems of
women who seek abortion, as is clear from Doe v. Bolton. 88 In Doe, the
petitioner demanded an abortion, due to her “poverty and inability” and the
medical advice that “an abortion could be performed on her with less danger
to her health than if she gave birth to the child she was carrying.” 89 The
request was denied, as Georgia law prohibited abortion except for protecting
the life or health of the mother, mental or physical defect of the fetus or in
the case of pregnancies resulted from forcible or statutory rape. 90 She
challenged the law as vague, violative of due process, and denied her the
“right to decide when and how many children she will bear” which invaded
her “rights of privacy and liberty in matters related to family, marriage, and
sex, and deprived her of the right to choose whether to bear children.” 91
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, held that the medical judgment to
abortion “may be exercised in the light of all factors–physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of
the patient.”92 He therefore held that the impugned provisions did not stand

84
The burden of pregnancy is so great that the court was justified in including in
it the right to abortion within the ambit of right to privacy. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 924 (1978).
85
Transcript of Oral Arguments before Court on Abortion Case available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/27/us/transcript-of-oral-arguments-before-court-onabortion-case.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
86
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 858 (2005).
87
Thus, there have been federal and state restrictions on welfare payment for
abortions, enactment of the Hyde Amendment, insistence on consent of the spouse, and
parents of minors and the alternative of judicial bypass virtually restricted the liberty of
women to procure abortion. See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An
Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 842–43 (1998).
88
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
89
Id. at 185.
90
Ga. Criminal Code § 26-1202(a) (1973). The law modeled on the Model Penal
Code of the American Penal Institute, apart from limiting the scope of right to abortion,
provided that abortion shall be performed only in the hospitals accredited by the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation that, performance of abortion shall have to be approved by a
committee of the medical staff of the hospital and that two other physicians shall certify that
for the reasons enumerated abortion is necessary.
91
Doe, 410 U.S. at 186.
92
Id. at 192. (emphasis added)
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constitutional scrutiny and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution.
C. Roe Destabilized
With the establishment of the right to abortion as an element of the
right of the woman to self-autonomy in Roe, 93 administrative attempts,
influenced by theological and religious thought, began to be directed at
regulating some rights, which in effect would disable women to procure
abortion freely. 94 Such attempts can broadly be classified as (a) those
insisting on consent of third parties for procuring abortion, (b) restriction on
the right to choose the method of abortion, and (c) withdrawal of the State
from rendering public hospitals as well as financial support from nontherapeutic abortions. 95 The above measures discourage pregnant women
from freely procuring abortion, which consequently amounts to trampling
personal liberty.
1. Right to Autonomy v. Consent of Third Parties
There are two situations in which third party consent to abortion
comes into play: abortion by minors and adults. In the cases of adult married
women, laws began to insist on spousal consent and in the cases of
unmarried minors, on the consent of the minor’s parents. Some laws even
provided for judicial substitute as an alternative. Immediately after Roe a
prominent case examined the validity of a legislative attempt to require third
party consent to abortion—Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth.96 Danforth examined the constitutionality of a Missouri law that
controlled abortion in all stages of pregnancy, and, among other things,
provided that no abortion be performed during the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy without the consent of the spouse of the pregnant woman, and
without the consent of the parents in the case of an unmarried woman below
the age of 18.97

93

Marjorie M. Shultz, Abortion and Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our
Concerns, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. WOMEN’S STUD., 80 (1992)
94
Religious groups, particularly Catholic Church, believing that “only God, as
the author of human life, has absolute dominion over it” have stood in favour of the laws
restrictive of abortion in US. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE & MORALITY,
433–438 (Macmillan Pub. Co., 1972); see also N.E.H. HULL & PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE
V. WADE—THE ABORTION RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 185–92. (2001).
There have been instances of direct opposition from the Church against liberalization of
abortion. See, e.g., A Statement on Abortion, 15 CATH. LAW. 259, 260 (1969).
95
See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Doe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989).
96
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
97
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 68–69, 72.
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Reiterating Roe, the Court held that the provisions requiring the
spousal and parental consent infringed upon the right of privacy.98 Although
from the familial point of view both the father and the mother have an
interest in the fetus, the biological proximity that the mother enjoys over the
fetus confers on her a claim over the socially created interest that the father
has over the fetus thus enabling her to decide abortion unilaterally. Hence, in
striking down the impugned provision of spousal consent, the Court held:
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband
disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two
marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman
who physically bears the child and who is the more directly
and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor. 99
The right to abortion had attained another dimension in the wake of
increasing unmarried pregnancies among the teenagers in the west, which by
the 1980’s was a problem for America.100 The Court in Danforth specifically
examined the question of the scope and extent of the liberty of minors’ vis-àvis the right of their parents to control. Referring to the issue of parental
consent, Justice Blackmun remarked:
Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse . . .
the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the
patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding
the consent. Constitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. 101
Dealing with the restrictions imposed on abortion by the stipulation
for spousal and parental consent and examining the consequential problems,
Danforth inimitably carries the torch lit by Roe.102
Later, in Bellotti v. Baird, the Court had to deal with a new
dimension of the right to abortion. 103 In Bellotti, the Court examined the
98

Id. at 60, 69–71, 75. (Any independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of
the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”)
99
Id. at 71.
100
RHODE, supra note 80, at 315.
101
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
102
Id. at 67–75.
103
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (finding the law enacted by the State of
Massachusetts prohibiting abortions of an unmarried woman below the age of 18 years
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validity of a Massachusetts law that stipulated that an abortion on a person
below the age of 18 could be performed only with the consent of both the
parents and if one of them refused, required judicial approval. 104 The Court
made four initial observations on how the law treats children. First, while
children and adults are afforded similar constitutional protections, the State is
“entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability.”105
Second, states may limit the ability of children to make decisions with
serious consequences. 106 Third, the role parents play in the upbringing of
their children “justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.”107And fourth,
the Court noted that a “child, merely on account of his minority, is not
beyond the protection of the Constitution.”108
Moreover, a “pregnant minor’s options are much different from
those facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry.”109 Therefore, the state requirement that a parent’s consent must be
obtained before a minor’s abortion will be valid only if qualified by an
alternative procedure enabling the minor to prove she is “mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her
physician, independently of her parents’ wishes.”110 The Court extended this
alternative procedure by finding that the minor is entitled to show that
abortion is in her best interest.111 Against this backdrop, the Court held that
the Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent without providing an
opportunity to establish that the minor was mature and fully competent to
assess the implications of the choice she has made imposed an undue burden
on the minor.112
It was in a tenor of consistency with the above view that the Court in
H.L. v. Matheson, examining the provision in a Utah statute, held that unlike
in Bellotti, the provision in Matheson did not allow parents or the court to
overrule or veto the minor’s choice to have an abortion.113 Pointing out that
though the requirement of notice to parents “may inhibit some minors from
without obtaining the consent of both the parents, and requiring judicial approval if the parents
withheld consent is unconstitutional.)
104
MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.112, §12S (West 1979).
105
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 637.
108
Id. at 633; see also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
109
Belotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
110
Id. at 643–644. For, “many parents hold strong views on the subject of
abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly
vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court.” Id. at
647.
111
Id. at 643–44.
112
Id. at 647, 650.
113
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408, 411 (1980) (reviewing UTAH CODE
ANN.§§ 76-7-314(3), 76-3-204(1), 76-3-301(3) (1978) (requiring a physician before
performing abortion on a dependent, unmarried, minor female to “notify, [her parents] if
possible”).
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seeking abortions [it] is not a valid basis to void the statute” and hence
cannot be considered to be too overbroad in scope so as to violate the right to
privacy of the petitioner. 114
Later, the Court, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health (“Akron-I”), examined the constitutionality of an ordinance enacted
by the city of Akron, Ohio regulating abortions which, among other things,
provided that abortion on women below the age of fifteen shall not be
performed without the informed written consent of one of the parents or
guardians.115 In spite of the rulings in Danforth and Bellotti to the contrary,
the challenged ordinance denied the right to abortion to all minors below the
age of fifteen without parental approval and also without providing an
alternative procedure.116 Reiterating its views in Danforth and Bellotti, the
Court observed that there should not be blanket regulation of abortion in the
case of all minors, irrespective of their maturity. 117 Therefore, “the State
must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may
demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision
herself, or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best
interests.”118 The Court found the provision unconstitutional.119
Yet another dimension of abortions by minors was given judicial
consideration in Hodgson v. Minnesota.120 The Court examined the validity
of a Minnesota law that provided that no abortion was to be performed on an
un-emancipated minor below the age of 18 years until at least 48 hours after
written notification of both the minor’s parents. 121 Exceptions within the
Minnesota statute provided that notification was not required if the physician
certified that an immediate abortion was needed to save the minor from death
and there was not sufficient time for serving notice to her parents; if the
minor was a victim of parental abuse; or if both the parents had already

114

Id. at 413.
City of Akron v. Akron Centr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. (Akron-I), 462 U.S. 416
(1983); AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870 §§ 1870.01-.19, 1870.05(B) (1978).
§§ 1870.03-.16 also provided that abortions after the first trimester of pregnancy be performed
in hospitals only; that the physician shall make statements to the patient to ensure that her
consent is informed consent; that there shall be a twenty-four hour gap between the consent
and the abortion and that the fetal remains be disposed in a humane and sanitary manner.
116
Akron-I, 462 U.S. at 422 n. 4.
117
Id. at 439–40
118
Id. This was accepted and followed in Planned Parenthood Association v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
119
Akron-I, 462 U.S. at 442.
120
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
121
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.343(2)–(7) (1990). The law with certain exceptions
provided that no abortion shall be performed on a woman below the age of 18 until the expiry
of 48 hours of notice to her parents, unless the physician certifies that immediate abortion was
necessary to prevent her death within which time notice could not be served to them, or that
both of her parents have consented to the abortion given in writing or that she declares that she
was a victim of parental abuse. The law did not provide for giving the minor an opportunity to
apply to the court to avoid the consent of the parents.
115
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consented to the abortion. 122 The Court observed that the requirement for
“two-parent notification” failed to serve any state interest in protecting the
minor or providing them with the benefit of parental advice. 123 Further,
absence of the provision that enabled the minor to avoid the consent of
parents by a judicial bypass was “not related to legitimate state goals,” and
hence the Court held the challenged provisions unconstitutional.124
Conversely, the Court held a similar Ohio law constitutional in Ohio
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.125 While examining the validity of
a similar enactment that criminalized abortion of “unmarried [women], under
eighteen years of age, and unemancipated” the Court held that statute did not
“impose an undue, or otherwise unconstitutional, burden on the minor
seeking an abortion,” and hence was constitutional.126 Unlike Hodgson, the
stipulation in the impugned law was only to seek the consent of one of the
parents for 24 hours, which could be judicially bypassed.127
The scope of the reproductive decision of minors, though forming
part of their right to personal liberty, cannot be identical with that of adults.
Minors have the right to privacy, but the right to abortion will be available to
a minor only if she is found to be mature enough to exercise the same. Even
though the right to bear or beget a child without unwarranted governmental
intrusion is an aspect of the right to privacy, it is in the interest of the state
that there be more restrictions on abortions by minors.128 It is taking these
aspects into consideration that the Court in Danforth, Bellotti, and Akron
accepted the power of state to “regulate a child’s right to make reproductive
decisions more extensively than an adult’s right.”129
2. Casey—Strut or Stride?
Questions relating to third party consent for abortion by adult
woman came up for judicial reconsideration in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 130 In Casey, a decision that has

122

Id.
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450–51. The Court observed, “Not only does two-parent
notification fail to serve any state interest with respect to functioning families, it disserves the
state interest in protecting and assisting the minor with respect to dysfunctional families. The
record reveals that in the thousands of dysfunctional families affected by this statute, the twoparent notice requirement proved positively harmful to the minor and her family.” Id. at 457.
124
Id. at 423, 457.
125
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
126
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.85 & 2505.073 (Supp 1988). Unlike Hodgson,
here the Ohio Statute stipulated for seeking the consent of one of the parents with a provision
for judicial bypass; Ohio, 497 US at 519–20.
127
Id.
128
Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal
Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1666 (1978).
129
Id.
130
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
123
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received much accolade for protecting the right of women to abortion,131 the
Court examined provisions dealing with the right of third parties to
consent. 132 The Court noted the moral and spiritual disagreements
surrounding the issue of termination of pregnancy and cautioned that
morality should not control the trajectory of judicial decisions.133 The Court
stated that its role is “to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code”. 134 The Court doubted whether the State could solve such
philosophic questions at the cost of the choice of women in this matter and
warned that the accepted constitutional doctrine was that such individual
choices should “not intrude upon a protected liberty” on matters of personal
decisions which include those relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationship and child rearing. 135 Additionally, the
Court doubted whether “the State can resolve these philosophic issues in
such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except
perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger
to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest.”136 Moreover, the
Court noted that:
For matters involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
131
FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 82, at 117; see also Devins supra note 82, at
1322. (“Casey settled the abortion wars in two ways. First, the decision helped create an
environment in which the Supreme Court is unlikely either to overturn Roe or to return the
Roe trimester test. Second, the decision helped create an environment in which state
lawmakers—if and when Roe were overturned—would be unlikely to outlaw abortion or pass
more stringent restrictions (than those enacted by Pennsylvania and approved by the Supreme
Court in Casey).”
132
Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990). It inter alia
provided that a married woman seeking abortion shall declare that her husband has been
notified of the decision; that abortion services are subject to keeping of record-keeping
requirements including non-notifying of the intended abortion to her husband and that a minor
seeking abortion shall obtain the consent of one of her parents/guardians unless judicially
bypassed.
133
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 851. The Court observed, “Men and women of good conscience can
disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our
decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The
underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in
such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those rare
circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the
result of rape or incest.” Id. at 850–51
136
Id.
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of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.137
Reiterating and reaffirming the principles laid down in Roe, the
Court held that there were limitations on the power of the State to interfere
with the freedom of a woman to make a decision to get an abortion.138 While
examining the requirement for spousal notification, the Court found that the
requirement was “likely to prevent a significant number of women from
obtaining an abortion.”139 The Court held:
[I]t does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or
expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a
substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact
that the significant number of women who fear for their
safety and the safety of their children are likely to be
deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the
Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.” 140
Thus, the Court held that the provision empowering the husband to
have authority over “the life of the child his wife is carrying”, necessitating a
woman to seek his advice before an abortion, was unconstitutional because
the “husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not
permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over
his wife.”141
The Court has correctly perceived the crux of the issue as the role of
the Constitution in this respect is only to facilitate the freedom of choice of
the individual in matters involving dignity and decency and should not
trample upon one’s freedom in the name of moral code or gender superiority.
Apart from upholding a woman’s right to abortion, Casey gives the message
that matters of personal choice shall not be controlled by a moral reading of
the Constitution.142 Casey, which astonished many, has been considered “one
of the most important decisions of this generation.”143
137

Id. at 851.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. The Court summarized the three principles enunciated
in Roe: “First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the
State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of
a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a
confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.” Id.
139
Id. at 893
140
Id. at 893–94 (emphasis added).
141
Id. at 898.
142
Id. at 850; Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (holding that a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to adult males who had engaged in consensual
138
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However, the decision in Casey partially overruled Roe by rejecting
the trimester framework and accepting viability of the fetus as the true
criterion for State regulation of pregnancy. 144 By discarding the trimester
framework, Casey continued the trend of increased restrictions on the right to
abortion, thereby enabling states to impose more restrictions on the right.145
Recently, the Court, in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England, examined the validity of a law enacted by the State of New
Hampshire that did not allow physicians to perform immediate abortions on
pregnant minors even on the ground of danger to health.146 The Court held
that “it would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a manner that subjects
minors to significant health risks.”147 Both the U.S. District Court of New
Hampshire and the First Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the law. 148
Reversing the decisions and remanding the case, the Supreme Court
observed that the lower courts should not nullify or rewrite a law unless
absolutely necessary.149 Thus, after the turn of the new century, the judiciary,
while balancing the rights of the individuals as against the state interests,
began to be influenced by the moral and religious concepts thereby diluting
the right to abortion as developed by Roe.150

act of sodomy in privacy of home. “The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for traditional family. For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.
These considerations do not answer the questions before us, however.”)
143
FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 82, at 117.
144
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–73.
145
See Daniel J. Zirim, Case Note Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania
v. Casey: Chipping Away at Roe v. Wade, 1 J. PHARMACY & L. 259 (1992) (discussing the
aftermath of Casey as it pertains to the Roe decision); see also Devins, supra note 82, at 1322.
146
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006).
In this case, the validity of a 2003 enactment by New Hampshire, which inter alia provided
regulations for abortion of pregnant minors without an exception for immediate abortion on
the ground of health of the minor was challenged. See Parental Notification Prior to Abortion
Act. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132:24–132 (2005). The Act prohibited physicians from
performing abortion on a pregnant minor until 48 hours after written notice of abortion to her
parent/guardian, unless required to prevent her death, where the guardian certified that notice
was already served or where notice was judicially bypassed. Id. at § 132:26 (I)(a), (II).
147
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328.
148
Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 296 F.Supp.2d 59 (D.N.H.
2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2003).
149
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331.
150
Stacy A. Scaldo, Life, Death & the God Complex: Effectiveness of
Incorporating Religion-Based Arguments into the Pro-choice Perspective on Abortion, 39 N.
KY. L. REV. 421, 422 (2012) (“True, the Court does not identify religion as the backbone of its
stated reasoning. However, when viewed in a responsorial context, the language of the
opinions demonstrates that religion, and religious beliefs about abortion, are at the heart of
these decisions.”)
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D. Does the Right to Abortion Include ‘Procedural Rights’?
Another issue the Supreme Court has had to address in considering
the right to abortion is what procedural rights are due to women who choose
to have an abortion. These issues include the withdrawal of state provided
financial aid, professional support which the State extends to therapeutics,
and State intervention in the freedom of the woman to choose the method of
abortion.
1. The Duty of the State to Facilitate and Fund Abortion
Exercise of a right which the State refuses to actively support is a
serious issue. 151 A right becomes meaningful not merely when the state
recognizes it, but when the state positively assists people to exercise the
same. 152 Leaving people to find the wherewithal and technical assistance
without help is tantamount to denial of right.153 Such an issue arose when
various states, in the guise of regulating abortion, enacted laws prohibiting
the use and services of public hospitals and public doctors in procuring
abortion. 154 Additionally, various states decided not to extend financial
support to non-therapeutic abortions.155
In Beal v. Doe, the Court examined the constitutionality of a state
regulation that denied medical aid for non-therapeutic abortions.156 Title XIX
of the federally approved Social Security Act, popularly known as Medicaid,
required States to provide qualified individuals with financial assistance.157
Examining whether the state regulation that limited financial assistance to
therapeutic abortions was valid under Medicaid, the Court held that although
the assumptions of the respondents about the economic and health aspects
were true, Roe had accepted that the state had a more “valid and important
151

The person on whom a right is vested. See, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 221
(P.J. Fitzgerald ed.,12th ed. 1966).
152
Id. at 233.
153
See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995, 999 (1974); Khatri (II) v. State
of Bihar, 1 SCC 627, 631 (1981).
154
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L. J. 1281, 1301 n. 97 (1991).
155
See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (challenging § 3 of the
Pennsylvania Medicaid program which restricts medical aid to abortions that are medically
necessary.) Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (challenging § 275 of the regulation of the
Connecticut Welfare Department which restrict medical aid to abortions that are medically
necessary).
156
Beal, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). The State of Pennsylvania limited the Medicaid
assistance to abortions that were medically necessary. An abortion is deemed medically
necessary if the continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the health of the mother; if there
is evidence that the child would be born with an incapacitating deformity or mental
deficiency; or if the pregnancy is from rape or incest relationship. Id. at 441 n. 3. Medical
necessity needs to be confirmed by two additional physicians. Id.
157
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
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interest in encouraging childbirth.” 158 This interest was not limited to the
third trimester, but existed “throughout the course of the woman’s
pregnancy.” 159 Observing that respondents could not point out any
unreasonableness of the impugned measure as against the federal law, the
Court upheld the decision of the state of Pennsylvania to deny medical aid to
non-therapeutic abortions.160
In Maher v. Roe, dealing with a similar regulation of the Connecticut
Welfare Department, Justice Powell speaking for the Court was more
vociferous in holding that limiting state financial aid to medically necessary
abortions did not violate the fundamental right recognized in Roe, though it
impinged upon the right of indigent women. 161 Justice Powell further
observed that the “indigency that may make it difficult, and in some cases,
perhaps impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor
in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.”162 The Court went to the
extent of holding that the “Constitution imposes no obligation on the States
to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed
to pay any of the expenses of the indigents.”163
Three years later, in Harris v. McRae, examining whether the Hyde
Amendment, which denied public funding for certain medically necessary
abortions, violated a woman’s right to privacy, the Court held that the
fundamental right of the woman to choose to have an abortion simply does
not carry “with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to
avail herself of the full range of protected choices.” 164 Furthermore, the
Court noted:
[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path
158
Beal, 432 U.S. at 445. The respondents pointed out that where the State denied
abortion, it would be confronted with a greater liability associated with childbirth. Similarly,
abortion at an early stage is safer than childbirth.
159
Id. at 446.
160
Id. It has been criticized that such steps on the part of the State would only
delay the procuring of an abortion and also that such measures would only help increase
unlawful abortions but not abortions as such. Cf. Frances Olsen, Comment Unraveling
Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1989), reprinted as Unraveling Compromise, in
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 335–53 (Patricia Smith ed., 1992).
161
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. In addition to right to abortion challenge, the
regulation was also challenged on the ground that it violated due process of law and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as it affected the right of the indigent women to
procure an abortion. Id. at 475–78. Justice Powell observed, “The Connecticut regulation
places no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion. An
indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of
Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
sources for the service she desires.” Id. at 474. For a critique on indigency and violation of the
equal right to abortion, see Note, The Right of Equal Access to Abortions, 56 IOWA L. REV.
1015 (1970).
162
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
163
Id. at 470.
164
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 303, 316 (1980).
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of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not
remove those not of its own creation. . . . The financial
constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice
are the product not of governmental restrictions but rather of
her indigency.165
The Court also held that the Hyde Amendment, by its policy of
encouraging child birth, was rationally related to the legitimate objective of
protecting potential life.166 Thus, the holdings in Beal, Maher, and McRae
indicate that the right to abortion, embedded in the right to privacy in the
Constitution, did not encompass the right to seek financial support for the
indigent woman, and considerably circumscribed the scope of the right.167 It
is true that in these cases, the Court was not directly restricting the right of a
woman to seek abortion. Nevertheless, acceptance of the proposition that the
right does not include the right to seek financial aid from the government is
virtually a denial of the right for an indigent woman.168 A close reading of
the judgments reveals that the Court, while examining the issue, has been
influenced by the theological concept of “sanctity of life”.169
There was a comprehensive reconsideration of the right to state
assistance for abortion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services that
began a new and undesirable trend in the history of the rights of women. 170
The case arose out of a class action challenging a Missouri law as violative
of the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. 171 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals that invalidated certain provisions of a law dealing
with the unborn and abortion. 172 The impugned law, among other things,
provided that the life of human beings “begins at conception,” that “unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being,” with equal
rights with other human beings, and required physicians performing abortion
165

Id. (quotation omitted).
Id. at 325.
167
For an evaluation as to how the Act would affect indigent women, see Marjorie
R. Sable, The Hyde Amendment: Its Impact on Low Income Women with Unwanted
Pregnancies, 9 W. MICH. J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 475 (1982).
168
Harris, 448 US at 316.
169
Id. at 319–20 (“The Hyde Amendment . . . is as much a reflection of
“traditionalist” values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular
religion. In sum, we are convinced that the fact that the funding restrictions in the Hyde
Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not,
without more, contravene the Establishment Clause.” (citations omitted)).
170
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servcs, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In 1989 the Governor
of Missouri signed a law, which substituted the Missouri Senate Committee Substitute for
House Bill No, 1596 that amended the then existing law relating to unborn children and
abortion.
171
Id. at 501.
172
Id. at 503.
166
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of a pregnancy beyond 20 weeks to ascertain whether the fetus was viable.173
Additionally, the Act prohibited the use of public employees and facilities to
perform or assist abortions not necessary to save mother’s life, and
prohibited the use of public funds and employees or facilities for the purpose
of “encouraging or counseling” a woman to have abortion not necessary to
save her life.174
The Court observed that what is contained in the preamble of the Act
was merely the “findings” of the Missouri legislature and was to be
interpreted by the state courts and examined by the federal courts only when
it was applied to restrict the activities of persons. 175 Rationalizing from a
perspective different from that of the previous cases, the Court observed that
the prohibition of the use of public funds, employees, and facilities placed no
obstacles on a woman seeking abortion, and therefore, the restrictions
imposed by the Missouri statute were constitutional.176 The Court reasoned
that having “held [in McRae and Maher] that the State’s refusal to fund
abortions does not violate Roe v Wade, it strains logic to reach a contrary
result for the use of public facilities and employees.”177 Similarly, the Court
also stated that although the requirement of viability testing to ascertain the
“gestational age, weight, and lung maturity” of a fetus older than twenty
weeks by the physician performing the abortion increased costs, it also
“furthers the State’s interest in protecting potential human life” and is
therefore constitutionally valid. 178 This decision has been condemned as a
denial of the right to “abortions to many women too poor or otherwise unable
to find a doctor and hospital with no state connections.”179 Though stopping
short of overruling Roe, the decision in Webster reveals a clandestine attempt
to destroy the conceptual structure of Roe facilitating future attempts by
legislatures to disregard the Roe decision.180
The rationale of Webster that the Due Process Clause “generally
confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests” was extended further
173

MO. REV. STAT. §§1.205.1(1),(2). (Preamble) (1986); Webster, 492 U.S. at 501.
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 188.205, .210, .215 (1986).
175
Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
176
Id. at 510
177
Id. at 509–10. The Court justified the viability testing provision as promoting
the interest of the State in potential human life. Id. at 515. It repelled the arguments relating to
the preamble that declared that life begins at conception, holding that “the preamble doe not
by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellees’ medical practice.” Id. at 506.
178
Webster, 492 U.S. at 519–20 (citations omitted).
179
The Great Abortion Case, supra note 79, at 60. It is a truism that even in the
wake of prohibition of abortion, rich were able to keep such restrictions limited to statute
books while it was the poor who suffered from such prohibitions. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFF.
L. REV. 107, 118–19 (1982).
180
The Great Abortion Case, supra note 79, at 63. “The conclusion is irresistible
that he had determined in advance somehow to damage Roe v. Wade without explicitly
overruling it . . . .”
174
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in Rust v. Sullivan. 181 In Rust, while examining the validity of the
Department of Health and Human Services regulations that excluded
abortion from the purview of funding for family-planning services, the Court
distinguished the right to an abortion from the right to receive aid for an
abortion.182 The Court held that the government had “no constitutional duty
to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally
protected” and that the government “may validly choose to fund childbirth
over abortion” by funding childbirth and excluding abortion.183
E. Whether the Right to Abortion Includes the Right to Choose the
Method
Does the right to abortion include the right to adopt the method of
abortion the woman prefers? This question came up before the Supreme
Court a few times particularly in relation to the mode of exercising the right
in tune with the existing socially and scientifically accepted procedure.184 It
is generally accepted that conferment of a right is bereft of its meaningful
content unless its holder is given the freedom of choice for exercising it.185
This is all the more so in the case of liberty which, unlike a right, denotes the
total freedom of a person of enjoying it.186 Such a proposition implies that
the right of a person not to be interfered with includes the right to decide how
liberty is to be exercised.187 The right to abortion being an instance of liberty
becomes meaningless if the woman is denied the freedom to choose the
method for performing it.
Such an issue came up as early as 1976 in Danforth which examined
the validity of § 9 of the impugned law that prohibited using of saline
amniocentesis as a method for abortion.188 The provision was incorporated as
a measure to protect maternal health. Reversing the decision of a three-judge
panel out of District Court of Eastern Missouri and observing that the
181

See Webster, 492 U.S. at 491; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 201.
183
Id.
184
See, e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52; Akron-I, 462 U.S. at 416; Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 476 U.S. 747 (1985); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000).
185
ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE, 177 (1959) (“Summing up we may say that
the concept of rights is typically used to indicate a situation in which the legal order has
desired to assure to a person liberty and power to behave—within a specified sphere—as he
chooses with a view to protecting his own interests.”)
186
See Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] AC 495, 534 (Eng.) Referring to the right to
liberty, Lord Lindley observed, “This liberty is a right recognized by law; its correlative is the
general duty of every one not to prevent the free exercise of this liberty except so far as his
own liberty of action may justify him in so doing.” (emphasis in original).
187
WESTLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, 43 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920).
188
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75–79. Saline amniocentesis is a method by which the
“amniotic fluid is withdrawn and ‘a saline or other fluid’ is inserted into the amniotic sac.” Id.
at 75.
182
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impugned restrictions force women and physicians to resort to more
dangerous methods of abortion, the Court held that the restriction did not
withstand constitutional challenge in the wake of the unavailability of safer
alternative methods.189
New dimensions regarding the scope of State power to restrict the
right to select the mode of abortion came up for judicial examination in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 190 Analyzing the
provisions of the statute under challenge, the Court held that the right of the
unborn could be said to be a matter of state interest only from the stage of
viability, and the state should therefore not interfere with the right to abortion
during the pre-viability stage. 191 The Court found that the provisions
requiring hospitalization for abortions after the end of the first trimester
amounted to “a significant obstacle in the path of a woman seeking abortion”
and hence infringed her constitutional right to abortion, as such abortions
could be performed through the method of D&E on an outpatient basis at a
lesser expense.192 The Court also observed that the statutory requirement of a
physician personally discussing matters relating to abortion would not serve
any state interest. 193 Similarly, the insistence on a 24-hour waiting period
after signing the consent letter increases the costs, and in some cases the risk,
of abortion without serving any state interest and hence was
unconstitutional. 194 Evidently, the Court determined that the procedural
formalities which denied medical benefits to women without any
demonstrable state interest created “a significant obstacle in the path of
woman seeking an abortion.”195
Later, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, examining the validity of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control
Act of 1982, the Court determined that the requirement to inform the
pregnant woman before abortion about the “detrimental physical and
psychological effects” and the medical risks involved would only increase
189

Id. at 76–79; See also, D.V. Glass, The Effectiveness of Abortion Legislation in
Six Countries, 2 MOD. L. REV. 97, 123 (1938) (“…in cases of necessity, women will have
recourse to any method, no matter how dangerous the consequences, to prevent the birth of
children they do not want.”)
190
Akron-I, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). An Akron, Ohio city ordinance, “The Regulation
of Abortions” stipulated that abortions performed after the first trimester be done in hospitals,
abortions on unmarried minors below 15 years could be conducted only with the consent of
her parents, that the physician should confirm that the woman has given informed consent,
that there is a gap of 24 hours between the consent and the abortion and finally, that the fetal
remains be disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner. Violation of the ordinance was
considered a penal misdemeanor. Both the District Court and the US Court of Appeals held
that some provisions of the ordinance were violative of the Constitution, and this appeal was
filed.
191
Id. at 428–30.
192
Id. at 434, 36, 39.
193
Id. at 448.
194
Id. at 450.
195
Id. at 434.
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the anxiety of the patient, and interfere with the professional judgment of the
physician.196 The Court stated, “[t]his type of compelled information is the
antithesis of informed consent.”197 Referring to the provision in the Act that
enabled the public to have access to the records of abortions, the Court
warned that the government could not be allowed to “chill the exercise of
constitutional rights by requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes
unpopular, activities,” that a “woman and her physician will necessarily be
more reluctant to choose an abortion if there exists a possibility that her
decision and her identity will become known publicly” and held that the
provision for making the details of abortion available for public inspection
was invalid.198 Similarly, the stipulation in the Act requiring the presence of
a second physician to take care of the child during abortion of a likely viable
fetus was found unconstitutional.199
The issue relating to the method for choosing abortion came up for a
serious judicial debate in Stenberg v. Carhart. 200 In Stenberg the Court
examined the validity of a Nebraska statute that criminalized “partial birth
abortion,”—also called the D & X method—except to save the life of the
mother “endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising
from the pregnancy itself.”201 The Court found that the Nebraska Act shows
concern for the life of the unborn and prevents cruelty to partially born
children.202 Observing that the application of the statute both to pre-viability
and post-viability abortions alike aggravated the constitutional problem, the
Court held that absence of an exception in the statute for the protection of the
health of the mother, which according to the Court included the risk that
“happens to arise from regulating a particular method of abortion” imposed
an undue burden upon the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.203 The
Court reiterated that the health of the woman is the interest of the State not
only in pregnancy, but also in regulating the methods of abortion, and hence
women could not be forced to use riskier methods of abortion. 204 On the
above grounds, the Court held the impugned law unconstitutional. 205 In a
small but pithy concurring opinion Justice Stevens observed:
196

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1)(ii–iii)

(1982)).
197

Id.
Id. at 766–68 (the court held so even though the chances for revealing the
identity of the woman were very remote).
199
Id. at 771.
200
Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914.
201
Id. at 921–22 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 1999)). Nebraska
law defines “partial birth abortion” as “an abortion procedure in which the person performing
the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child
and completing the delivery.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999).
202
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
203
Id. at 930, 931, 938.
204
Id. at 530 U.S. at 931.
205
Id. at 530 U.S. at 922.
198
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[T]he word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes
a woman’s right to make this difficult and extremely
personal decision–makes it impossible for me to understand
how a State has any legitimate interest in requiring a doctor
to follow any procedure other than the one that he or she
reasonably believes will best protect the woman in her
exercise of this constitutional liberty. 206
However, the holding in Stenberg got a not-so-gleeful
reconsideration in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the constitutionality of the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was addressed by the Court.207 The
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act was challenged on the ground that the Act
was overbroad and vague and imposed an undue burden on women seeking
abortions, and hence, was invalid on its face.208 Unlike the law struck down
by the Supreme Court in Stenberg, the impugned statute in Gonzales did not
proscribe the other prevailing methods of abortion medically accepted in the
first trimester of pregnancy. 209 Intact D&E is a method in which a doctor
extracts the fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes, pulling out
its entire body instead of ripping it apart.210 Though the law applied to both
pre-viability and post-viability pregnancies alike, and thus was contrary to
the decision of Roe, the Court, falling back upon the rights of the unborn and
the sanctity of life which the impugned Act tried to uphold, held that the law
did not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. 211 The Court additionally
explained that “by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus
is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable
outside the womb.” 212 The Court ultimately rejected the petitioners’
contention, holding that the law was not “void for vagueness, does not
impose an undue burden from any overbreadth, and is not invalid on its
face.”213
From the observation of the Court, it is clear that it was attempting to
impart moral instruction about the bond of love of the mother for the child
206

Id. at 946 (Stevens J. concurring).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 136 (2006).
208
Id. at 144–45.
209
Compare NEB REV. STAT. §§ 28–326(9), 328(1) with Partial Birth Abortion
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2014).
210
Katia Desrouleaux, Banning Partial-Birth Abortion at All Costs-Gonzales v.
Carhart: Three Decades of Supreme Court Precedent “Down the Drain”, 35 S.U. L. REV.
543, 548 (2008)
211
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146, 158, 168. The Court observed, “Where it has a
rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory
power to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life
of the unborn.” Id. at 158. The Court observed, “No one would dispute that, for many, D & E
is a procedure itself laden with the power to devalue human life.” Id.
212
Id. at 147 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
213
Id. at 147.
207
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embedded in the respect for human life, which cannot be reconciled with the
right to abortion.214 It appears that the Supreme Court, quite contrary to its
holding in Lawrence v. Texas, was giving an emphatic endorsement of a
moral reading of the Constitution.215 The dissenting view of Justice Ginsberg
however, lamented that the decision was alarming. She observed that, on the
one hand, the decision was contrary to Casey and Stenberg, in that those
cases recognized the right to abortion not only as part of the right of a
woman to privacy but also “on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.” 216 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg opined that the Court neglected the widening spectrum of roles of
women which once centered on “home and family life, with attendant special
responsibilities that precluded full and independent legal status under the
Constitution.” 217 In the present state of gender equality, women enjoy
“autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature,” which does not allow undue restrictions on abortion procedure.218
F. Right to Abortion Post-Roe—A Critique
Roe v. Wade opened a new era in the jurisprudence of human liberty.
Obviously, the rude shock from Roe paved the way for the religion-ridden
America to prefer the rights of women over the interests of fetus.219 Though
it opened the pathway for revolt against religious and traditional thinking, it
also spurred reaffirmation of the theological version of life. 220 This
reaffirmation is evident from the different laws enacted for limiting the right
of the minors to abortion, 24-hour waiting time, informed consent, spousal
consent, restrictions on the place and methods of abortion.
The whirlwind of objection to Roe was so intense that even the
Supreme Court began reconsidering the right to abortion, indicating a
paradigm shift in the attitude of the judiciary. In Roe, other aspects relating
to abortion, including restrictions on the right, were dealt with from the
214
Id. at 159. The Court observed, “Respect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as
well. Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision”. For an
illuminating critique of the case, see, Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
215
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (reasoning that the view of the governing
majority that a practice as immoral was not sufficient to uphold a law and that moral
disapproval could not be recognized as a ground for legitimate governmental interest).
216
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171–72 (Ginsberg J., dissenting).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 172.
219
Cf. FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 82 at 49. He observes: “The best historical
evidence shows, moreover, that even anti-abortion laws, which were not prevalent in the
United States before the middle of the nineteenth century, were adopted to protect the health
of the mother and privileges of the medical profession, not out of any recognition of a fetus’s
rights.” (emphasis added).
220
See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
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perspective of the interest of the mother. 221 But subsequently in Akron,
Danforth, Thornburgh, Webster and Casey, the Court viewed the right to
abortion as an interest at least in some context as in conflict with that of the
fetus.
Though originating as a feature of the right to privacy as protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to abortion has since gained
importance as a right to self-determination.222 In the wake of the “increasing
interest in the gender dimension of abortion”, the right to privacy, apart from
anonymity, includes the freedom to do things without being interfered with
by another.223 Though regulation of abortion is more of an issue of morality
than law, in the twentieth century scenario, apart from an issue of social
justice, it has turned to be one of human rights and gender equality and above
all, of “the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her
destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning of [her] liberty.” 224
Abortion is not merely a matter of women’s right to life and health, but their
“ability to realize their full potential” which is “intimately connected to ‘their
ability to control their reproductive lives’” enabling them “to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.”225 In other words, “the
capacity to become pregnant” shall not be “a lever to subordinate” women
denying them the full and equal rights as citizens. 226 Though, in some
221
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate
interest in the health of the mother the “compelling” point, in the light of the present medical
knowledge, is at approximately at the end of the first trimester. This is to because of the nowestablished medical fact . . . that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may
be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State
may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the
preservation and protection of maternal health.”).
222
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Carey v. Population Services Int’l., 431 U.S. 678,
685 (1977), Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–52 (“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society”), Stenberg,
530 U.S. at 914; Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 172 (Ginsberg J., dissenting); See also, Priscilla J.
Smith, Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves Women’s Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.
L. & POL’Y 97, 100 (2008).
223
Olsen, supra note 160 at 348.
224
Casey, 505 U.S. at 869; see Tatyana A. Margolin, Abortion as a Human Right,
29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 77 (2008) (disusing how the right to abortion as a human right is
important for the dignity of women). “Nature demands that women alone bear the physical
burdens of pregnancy, but society, through the law, can either mitigate or exaggerate the cost
of these burdens. When the state denies women access to abortion, both nature and the state
impose upon women burdens of unwanted pregnancy that men do not bear.” Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 352, 365 (Patricia Smith ed.,
1993).
225
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 856;
see Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action 1 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 318–21 (1994) (finding that statistics reveal that regulation of abortion
would only help increase illicit abortions, risking serious injury or death).
226
“When the state uses women’s capacity to become pregnant as a lever to
subordinate women, assign them a second class status in society, or deny them full and equal
enjoyment of their rights of citizenship, it violates the equal citizenship principle. It may not
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instances, the American judiciary also stood by the moral point of the
legislatures, in a majority of the cases, accepting the human right aspect
favored the rights of human beings, the equality of gender, and women’s
right to self-determination.227
V. THE INDIAN SCENARIO
A. Evolution of Indian Abortion Law
Unlike the west, ancient India, which was not under the influence of
Semitic religions, did not consider abortion as a serious offense. Abortion in
ancient India was rated as a lesser evil than usurious practice, which was
punishable by excommunication from the cast and denial of the right to
libation by water. 228 This position continued until the introduction of the
Indian Penal Code by the British in 1860.229 The Indian Penal Code, in which
permeates the Christian morality of the Common Law, brought severity to
abortion law in India.230
The Penal Code comprehensively dealt with abortion and provided
penalties for abortion in various forms. Nevertheless, unlike Britain, the
Code only regulated abortion but did not prohibit it.231 The Code imposed
different penalties for causing miscarriage of a ‘woman with child’ and
woman ‘quick with a child’, and treated the death of a quick unborn child as
amounting to culpable homicide.232 This position, rudimentary in all respects,
punishing abortion of unhealthy or undesirable fetus and abortion on
therapeutic grounds, continued until the enactment of a special law on the
subject viz., Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. 233 Such an
inattentive response of the rulers was not because abortion was not practiced
use pregnancy as a device to deny women equal citizenship or subordinate women precisely
because only women can get pregnant.” See, Balkin, supra note 72 at 322–23.
227
See, e.g., supra notes 71, 76, 78, 92, 99, 101, 110, 119, 135, 137, 141, 206 and
accompanying text.
228
BAUDHAYANA DHARMASUTRA, 1.10.23; APASTHAMBA DHARMASUTRA, 1.21.8;
MANUSMRITHI V., The Sacred Books of the East, 25, 89, 184 (Max Muller ed., George Buhler
trs., Motilal Banarsidas 1963) (1885).
229
PEN. CODE §§ 315–316 (1860).
230
CALLAHAN, supra note 64, at 150; see PEN. CODE § 312 (causing miscarriage
without consent); § 313 (death caused by act done with intent to cause miscarriage); § 314 (act
done with intent to prevent child being born alive or to cause it to be die after birth); § 315
(causing death of unborn child amounting to culpable homicide). Section 312 is the most
important among them. It reads, “Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry
shall, if miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the
woman, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine or with both, and if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall
also be liable to fine.”
231
PEN. CODE § 312
232
Id. at § 316.
233
Act 34 of 1971 (“MTP”).
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in India—for it was widely prevalent due to a variety of social and moral
conditions specific to India—but because, unlike the west, it was not
religiously tabooed. 234 The Act, which attempts to reconcile the issues
inherent in abortion, is, as evident from its objectives, forward looking.235
The Act provides that pregnancy can be terminated within 12 weeks236 and in
extreme cases not beyond 20 weeks. 237 Nevertheless, the Indian law of
abortion is in its nascent stage as far as the right of the woman to abortion is
concerned. Unlike the laws of abortion in the west, the MTP Act does not
classify abortion on the basis of viability, but instead allows abortion only if
the medical practitioners are of the opinion that “continuance of the
pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave
injury to her physical or mental health” or “that there is a substantial risk that
if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.”238 Moreover, it is clear from
the statute that no pregnancy beyond 20 weeks can be legally aborted except
to save the life of the woman. 239 To some extent, the MTP Act registers
advancement from the Indian Penal Code insofar as it allows abortion to
avoid grave mental injury of the woman and substantial risk of the child.
A notable lacuna of the Act is that it does not permit abortion in a
case where it is needed for the protection of the health of the pregnant
woman or to avoid the disabilities of the child if the abortion is advanced
beyond 20 weeks.240 Denial of the right to abortion of a fetus with disability
propensities detected after 20 weeks undoubtedly is a violation of a woman’s
right to life, liberty and choice.241 To that extent, the Act does not envisage
234

See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See Nand Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, A.I.R. 166 (Raj.) 93 (2006). The
objectives of the Act state that it “seeks to liberalize certain existing provisions relating to the
termination of pregnancy…” as a health measure—to save the life or health of the mother, on
humanitarian grounds—when pregnancy results from rape or intercourse with a lunatic
woman; and on eugenic grounds—when there is the risk that the child, if born, would suffer
from certain deformities or diseases. The Act hence, has been opined to be in consonance with
the constitutional mandate under Article 21.
236
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, No. 34 of 1971§ 3(2)(a), 33 A.I.R.
MANUAL.
237
Id. at § 3(2)(b).
238
Id. at § 3(2)(b)(i–ii).
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., Nikhil D. Dattar v. Union of India, (2008) 110 Bom. L. R. 3293.
After 20 weeks, medical termination of pregnancy is allowed only if “termination of such
pregnancy is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.” MTP Act, supra
note 233 § 5. It is also pointed out that the Act grants very wide discretion to the doctors as to
procuring abortion. See Sai Abhipsa Gochayat, Understanding the Right to Abortion Under
Indian Constitution at 3 (January 30, 2011) available at http://manupatra.com/roundup
/373/Articles/PRESENTATION.pdf.
241
MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY—A USER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW 18, 45
(Indira Jaising ed., 2004). See also Siddhivinayak S. Hirve, Abortion Law, Policy and Serivces
in India, 12(24) REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 114, 114 (2004). The provisions of the Act have
been construed to deny abortion unless the husband consents to it.
235
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abortion on socio-eugenic grounds.242 The inability of the statute to provide
protection of the rights of women in the feminist era was revealed with the
decision of Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration243 The
underlying controversy in Suchita Srivastava & Anr. involved a mentally
retarded woman who, while an inmate in a government run institute, became
pregnant as a result of rape.244 On detection of pregnancy, the Chandigarh
Administration approached the High Court of Punjab seeking permission for
termination of the pregnancy. The High Court granted permission despite the
mother’s willingness to deliver the child and contrary to the statute, as her
pregnancy had progressed beyond 19 weeks.245 The Supreme Court of India
overturned the High Court.246 Quoting Roe with approval, the Court observed
that a woman’s right to reproductive choice is a dimension of the rights to
personal liberty, privacy and dignity under Article 21, and extending the
logic further, reasoned that “reproductive rights include a woman’s
entitlement to carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to
subsequently raise children. 247 However, in the case of pregnant woman
there is also a ‘compelling state interest’ in protecting the life of the
prospective child.” 248
Despite the possibility that the mother did not fully understand the
pregnancy’s implications and her responsibilities as a mother, the Court did
not accept these facts as sufficient justification for judicial intervention
imposing abortion.249 Giving a very narrow interpretation to § 3(4)(a) of the
MTP, the Court held that the State must respect the autonomy of a mentally
retarded person, as the MTP did not empower the State to make decisions on
behalf of such a person in exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction.250
It is submitted that while so holding, the Court did not consider the
fact that the woman perhaps did not understand the potential for disgrace to
herself and the child, as well has her duty as a mother as intended by the
MTP Act.251 It appears that instead of being guided by the considerations of
242

MTP at § 3(2)(b)(ii). See also Lily Srivastava, LAW AND MEDICINE, 116 (2013).
A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 235 (India).
244
Id.
245
Id. at 237.
246
Id. at 248–49.
247
Id. at 242. The court held, “There is no doubt that a woman’s right to make
reproductive choices is also a dimension of ‘personal liberty’ as understood under Article 21
of the Constitution of India. it is important to [recognize] that reproductive choices can be
exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration is that
a woman’s right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should be respected. This means that
there should be no restriction whatsoever on the exercise of reproductive choices such as a
woman’s right to refuse participation in sexual activity or alternatively the insistence on use of
contraceptive methods…..”
248
Id.
249
Suchita Srivastava & Anr., A.I.R. 2010 S.C. at 245–46.
250
A.I.R. 2010 S.C. at 244.
251
MTP at § 3(2) (b) Explanation 1provides that anguish caused by pregnancy by
rape shall be presumed to constitute grave injury to the mental health of the woman.
243
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‘best interest of the patient’ as is usual in the cases of mentally incompetent
persons and minors,252 the Court in Suchitha Srivastava, refused to exercise
its inherent power.253 Viewed against such a backdrop it cannot be accepted
that a decision like Suchita Srivastava in the post-West Berkshire and
Stenberg era, is very regressive.254
B. Right of the Living and the Right to Sex Selection
An issue allied to the right of women to abortions that got legal
attention in India is the right to select the sex of the fetus. This right became
much debated, in part due to the Indian culture, which gives importance to
male offspring to the extent of discriminating against female children from
time immemorial.255 Advancement of science and technology was used in a
gender discriminatory style, causing a sharp decline in the number of female
fetuses.256 Small wonder, this became one of the burning issues in the era of
feminist rights.257 Hence, to prohibit such a trend of gender-based abortion of
fetuses, Parliament enacted the Pre-Conception & Pre-natal Diagnostic
Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994, which prohibits both
sex-selection through artificial reproductive techniques and sex
determination during pregnancy. 258 The Act, as is evident from the
objectives, preamble, and provisions, addresses the issue raised by the human
rights activists that determination of fetal sex and consequential abortion
infringe the rights of female fetuses.259 But, the law suffers from the defect
252

See, e.g., Re B, [1981] 3 All E.R. (C.A.) 927 (appeal taken from Eng.). See
also F v. West Berkshire Health Authority, [1989] 2 All E.R. (H.L.) 545, 548, 52, 62, 68.
253
In re B, allowing the application of the local authority for permission to
sterilizing a mentally incompetent minor girl, it was held that decision was to be taken in such
cases “in the best interests of …young woman and how best she can be given protection
which is essential to her future well-being so that she may led a full life as her intellectual
capacity allows.” [1987] 2 All E.R. (H.L.) 206, 219 (Lord Oliver). Later, in West Berkshire,
while dealing with the judicial power of allowing sterilization of a mentally disabled woman,
held that even when the parens partiae jurisdiction is lacking, courts can interfere “in the best
interests of the patient concerned”, for protecting the mentally incompetent persons as the
“law must not convert incompetent into second class citizens for the purpose of health care.”
[1989] 2 All E.R. (H.L.) 545, 571 (Lord Jauncey).
254
Stenberg, 530 US 914 (2000); See also, F v. West Berkshire Health Authority,
[1989] 2 All E.R. (H.L.) 545.
255
See 1 PANDURANG VAMAN KANE, HISTORY OF DHARMASSTRAS 623 (1993). See
also RASHMI KAPOOR, ADOPTION: BORN TO LIVE, IN SEX SELECTIVE ABORTION IN INDIA
GENDER, SOCIETY AND NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 232, 255–256 (Tulsi Patel ed.,
2007).
256
Fred Arnold et.al., Sex Selective Abortions in India, 28(4) POPULATION AND
DEV. REV. 759, 762–64, 770, 782 (2002); see also Robert D. Retherford and T. K. Roy
Factors Affecting Sex-Selective Abortion In India, 17 NAT’L FAMILY HEALTH SURVEY
BULLETIN, 1 (2003)
257
P. ISWARA BHAT, LAW AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 567 (1st ed. 2009).
258
See Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex
Selection) Act, No. 57 of 1994, INDIA CODE § 3A (2003).
259
Id.
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that it deals with the problem without addressing the issues which instigate
people to opt for it.260 In such a context, by prohibiting the right of a woman
to know the gender of the fetus she bears, the Act virtually denies her the
right to decide whether to beget the child. 261 Thus, there is an apparent
conflict between Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act and the PreConception Act. 262 Classification of the abortee as married, unmarried,
minor, and mentally ill,263 to prohibit abortion on the basis of the fetal gender
and ban of abortion after twentieth week of pregnancy except to save the life
of the mother amount to denial of the right of the woman to selfdetermination. With this in mind, it may not be wrong to conclude that the
trend of the Indian legal system fails to maintain an even balance between
the rights of the woman and the unborn child and has a long way to go before
it parallels the English or American law.264
VI. LOOKING FORWARD—ABORTION IN THE POST HUMAN
RIGHTS ERA
The history of abortion and its regulation is astounding. The socially
and biologically necessitated practice that initially emerged as an individual
issue in the ancient age 265 was later viewed as a moral and metaphysical
issue by theologians and moralists who, with their belief in sanctity of life
and the consequent recognition of the unborn as “persons,” have taken it
beyond the right of the woman to health and even to her life.266 Such pro-life
advocates ignored the fact that fetal claims to life, not included in the
concept of human life, have always remained merely “a statement of
religious faith.”267 Therefore, its protection has to be “for reasons relating to
260

BHAT, supra note 257.
It is pertinent to note that though such gender based rights have been much
discussed in Europe and America, no law has been enacted to that effect so far. See EUR.
PARL. ASS. REPORT., Prenatal Sex Selection, available at http:/ assembly.coe.int
/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=13158&lang=en (Dec. 16, 2011). For an
analysis of the procreative, personal, and parental rights of the woman to selective abortion in
the context of genetic and chromosomal conditions, see Jaime Staples King, Not This Child:
Constitutional Questions in Regulating Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective
Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2012).
262
See PRE-CONCEPTION AND PRE-NATAL DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES ACT, A USERS
GUIDE TO THE LAW 64 (Indira Jaising ed., 2004) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES ACT].
But, such a conflict was ruled out and the Act was held constitutionally valid in Vinod Soni v.
Union of India, (2005) 3408 Crim. L.J. (Bom. H.C) (13.6.2005); Vijay Sharma v. Union of
India, (2008) 95 A.I.R. 29, 30 (2005) (Bom).
263
DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES ACT, supra, note 262, at 18.
264
Id. at 45.
265
HULL & HOFFER, supra note 94, at 13.
266
Supra notes 30, 32, 34, 37 and accompanying text.
267
“Historical analyses of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948
(UDHR),85 ICCPR and ICRC—the major international human rights treaties conferring the
right to life—confirm that that right does not extend to fetuses. As the first pronouncement of
the right to life, Article 3 of the UDHR specifically limits that right to those who have been
261
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the well-being of existing human beings”.268 There are views that prohibition
of abortion has been for the protection of the interest of the mother. 269
Nevertheless:
[T]here are harms that are more certain to result from the
banning of abortion than from unrestricted legalization of it.
In particular one risks the harm of ignoring the clear
interests of actual persons to live in accordance with their
own liberty of conscience in the absence of comprehensive
moral and religious oppression. In hedging one’s bets to
protect the fetus, one is necessarily acting to oppress the
physical and mental freedom of pregnant women, who
unlike fetuses, are not in a state of moral ambiguity. 270
The Anglo-American law on abortion, influenced by theologians in
the beginning, has been unethical, as well as non-eugenic and non-social.271
The law has, at times, even denied therapeutic abortions. 272 Prohibition of
abortion assiduously advocated by the theologians in the Middle Ages on the
ground of religious views of sanctity of life, was later substituted by “the less
vulnerable doctrine of natural rights” in the Age of Reason that followed
Renaissance.273 Not surprisingly, the history of abortion law in the modern
age is one of diminishing regulation. It was only with the emergence of the
era of liberalism, engendered and necessitated by, the development of
science and technology that there was a reexamination of mystified status

‘born’. In fact, the term ‘born’ was intentionally used to exclude the foetus or any other
antenatal application of human rights. This is confirmed by the fact that a proposed
amendment to remove the term and protect the right to life from the moment of conception,
was denied.” See H.R.L. REV. 262–63; Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973); See also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at
202.
268
“[I]f we protect the fetus by law, it should be for reasons relating to the wellbeing of existing of human beings.” See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 208.
269
Cf. the observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Tate, that it “is
because the unskillful attentions of ignorant people in cases of this kind often result in death
that attempts to produce abortion are regarded by the law as very serious offences.”
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 146–47, 152, 154.
270
Lawrence Torcello, A Precautionary Tale: Separating the Infant from the
Fetus, 15 RES PUBLICA 17, 27 (2009).
271
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 160 where he observes, “So far there has been no
indication in the American or English cases that abortion would be legally justified on the
ethical ground that the mother was raped or the intercourse obtained by threat or fraud, or on
the eugenic ground that the father or mother is feeble-minded or affected with a transmissible
disease, or that the intercourse was incestuous; or on the economic ground that the parents
cannot well support another child, or that the mother is unmarried and to have the child would
result in her losing her employment or would interrupt an expensive course of training.”
272
Id. at 151.
273
Id. at 180.
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rights so as to recognize abortion as an individual right.274 The Bourne’s case
in England, followed by the legislative changes with the enactment of the
Infant Act and the Abortion Act 1967, as well as Roe and Casey, succeeded
by some state legislation in America stand testimony to this new judicial
outlook. 275 This trend was given a further impetus with the arrival of the
concept of the right of a person to self-determination with reference to
body.276 But it was the emergence of feminism that has explained why the
right to abortion should continue with wider scope.277
Nevertheless, two questions were left unattended by the judiciaries
and legislatures that allowed abortion. First, is not the restriction on the
rights of pregnant woman in the post-viability stage, a violation of her human
rights as many cases exist of “gross fetal defects that cannot be diagnosed
prior to viability?”278 Second, in spite of the detailed examination of the right
to abortion it is doubtful whether there has been a meaningful judicial or
legislative discussion on abortion vis-à-vis the plight of the child unwanted
and undesired by its mother.279 Is not the unborn entitled not to be born than
to be born handicapped 280 or, in extreme cases, to be subjected to
274

Cf. Betty Wolf, Abortion Law Reform At a Crossroads?,46 CHI-KENT L. REV.

102 (1969).
275

Undoubtedly, the response of the Supreme Court in Roe and Casey has
influenced the legislatures. Devins, supra note 82 at 1338–43.
276
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53.
277
The “abortion question was not merely a ‘women versus fetuses’ issue; it was
also a feminist issue, an issue going to women’s position in society. . . “; see Karst, The
Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1977); see also Morgentaler v. R, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 172. (Can.)
(Wilson J., concurring) (observing that, “[t]he right to reproduce or not to reproduce…is
properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and
worth as a human being.”; Gayle Binion, Feminist Theory Confronts US Supreme Court
Rhetoric: The Case of Abortion Rights, 11 INT’L J. P POL’Y & FAM. 63 (1997).
278
RHODE, supra note, 80, at 312. The civil law system appears to be far advanced
than the common lay systems in this respect. Many of the civil law systems like that of
Greece, Netherlands and Portugal allow abortions on the ground of fetal abnormality up to the
24th week of pregnancy. See, e.g., Shaun Pattinson, INFLUENCING TRAITS BEFORE BIRTH,
(2002) (cited in Shaun D. Pattinson, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS, 213 (2006)).
279
“Lack of parental love for the unwanted child is not merely a tragedy in the
child’s early youth; it is one of the major predisposing factors to juvenile delinquency, and so
can lead to a ruined career.” WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 199.
280
“Beyond danger to life and health, an open recognition of the defence on the
grounds given in the Scandinavian laws or the Model Penal Code, for humanitarian or eugenic
reasons, should raise no serious problem. Threatened with many other disasters, mankind has
no interest in the multiplication of defective children who will be a burden to themselves and
to others, nor is there moral justification to compel mothers to have children in the
circumstances of Bourn’s case.” See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 267 (2nd
ed. 1972); see also H.B. Munson, Abortion in Modern Times: Thoughts and Comments,
Renewal 9 (Feb. 1967) (observing, “[s]hould we not allow fetuses their right to die if there is a
strong likelihood of their being handicapped physically or mentally? Perhaps we are not big
enough or wise enough to make that decision, but there seems to be solid grounds for allowing
the unborn’s parents to decide this, since it is they who will be the most encumbered and
troubled in caring for the child.” See also CALLAHAN, supra note 64, at 453 (quoting same).
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euthanasia?281 Whenever legislators advocate regulation of abortion, it would
be better to remember that “laws against abortion do not save fetal life, but
merely make abortions less safe and make women criminals.” 282
Indiscriminate attempts to saving fetal life only:
[O]bscures the active role mothers play in procreation and is
yet another example of society’s tendency to devalue the
work that women do. Prohibiting abortion denigrates women
as moral decision makers, and it reinforces their role as
sexual objects by undermining their ability to act as sexual
agents. It further reduces the limited power that women are
allowed to exercise over their bodies and their sexuality in
our society.283
The observation that “ultimately, this is a question of values, of the
balancing between the interests in the safety and vigor of the community, and
the consideration of the individual as a person” is true of abortion also.284
Considering the multiplicity of issues involved, it is better that procuring of
abortions is left to the domain of private moral judgment which the state may
not encourage, discourage or prohibit.285

281
It is pertinent to note that as a post-world war measure, Japan passed the
Eugenic Abortion Law in 1948 giving liberty to mothers to resort to abortion on eugenic
grounds. See M. Yokoyama, Abortion Policy in Japan: Analysis from the Framework of
Interest Groups, 29 KOKUGAUIN J. OF L. & POLITICS 1 (1991). It is heartening to note that of
late more people have been considering abortion on fetal abnormality as eugenic. See
JACKSON, supra note 54, at 655.
282
Olsen, supra note 160, at 132.
283
Id. at 120–21.
284
See FREIDMANN, supra note 280, at 213.
285
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 141–43.
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